Stasis*

by Otto Alvin Loeb Dieter

As a rhetorical concept *stasis* may be almost as ancient as the physical *ta atoma*, or the concept of atoms, but modern rhetoricians seem to have been less successful in understanding and utilizing stasis than have modern scientists in exploiting the atom. However, I believe we may say that we have made some progress since Piderit[1] published his dissertation on Hermagoras more than a century ago. German, French, and English scholars[2] have made

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[1] Piderit, G., *De Hermagore rhetore* (Hersfeld, 1839).
[2] The Germans:
Volkmann, Richard. *Hermagoras, oder Elemente der Rhetorik* (Stettin, 1865).
_____, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Roemer* (Leipzig, 1885).
_____, *Rhetorik der Griechen und Roemer* von Dr. Richard Volkmann. Dritte Auflage besorgt von Casper Hammer (Muenchen, 1901).
Thiele, Georg, *Hermagoras, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Rhetorik* (Strassburg, 1893).
Jaeneke, Walther, *De Statuum Doctrina ab Hermogene tradita* (Leipzig, 1904).
Radermacher, L., *Hermagoras*, Pauly-Wissowa, *R. E.*, VIII.
Weidner, Richard, *Ciceros Verhaeltnis zur griechisch-roemischen Schulrhetorik seiner Zeit* (Erlangen, 1925).
Martin, Josef, *Grillius, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Rhetorik* (Paderborn, 1927).
Throm, Hermann, *Die Thesis, Ein Beitrag zu ihrer Entstehung und Geschichte* (Paderborn, 1932).
Stroux, Johannes, *Summum Ius Summa Iniuria in Festschrift Paul Speiser-Sarasin* (Basil, 1926).
_____, "Aus der Status-Lehre," *Philologus*, lxxxv, 1930.
_____, *Roemische Rechtswissenschaft und Rhetorik* (Potsdam, 1949).
Kroll, Wilhelm, *Das Epicheirema*. Sitzungsbericht der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Phil.-hist. Klasse, Vol. 216, 2, 1937.
_____, *Rhetorik* (Stuttgart, 1937).
Solmsen, Friedrich, *Die Entwickelung der Aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik* (Berlin, 1929).
_____, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *American Journal of Philology*, 1941, pp. 35-50, and 169-190.
The French:
Laurand, L., *De M. T. Ciceronis studiis rhetoricis* (Paris, 1907).
_____, *Manuel des Etudes Grecques et Latines* (Paris, 1929).
Cousin, Jean, *Etudes sur Quintilien* (Paris, 1936).
The English:
Cope, E. M., *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* (London, 1867), pp. 397-400.
Sandys, J. E., *The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary* (Cambridge, 1877), I, pp. 250-251; III, pp. 179, 198, 199.
_____, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Ad M. Brutum Orator* (Cambridge, 1885), p. 132.

significant contributions. Americans have in the main investigated the concept as described in some one rhetorical treatise and have sought in particular to establish an adequate English translation of the term. H. M. Hubbell's recent translation of Cicero's *De Inventione* sheds no new light on our problem. What Harry Caplan will give us on stasis in his forthcoming translation of the *Ad Herennium* remains still to be seen. We are hardly warranted, however, in expecting from any one edition, or from any translation of one rhetorical treatise, a comprehensive treatment of a concept which has played so important a role in rhetoric for so many centuries. Stasis requires and demands a comprehensive study of its own. To investigate its origin is in itself a large problem; to trace its ramifications in detail would be to write long chapters in the history of rhetoric.

In examining earlier attempts to define stasis, we seem now to recognize certain shortcomings and to notice certain peculiarities either in the scope of the investigations or in the methods of research which have no doubt influenced and perhaps also vitiated the conclusions. As such shortcomings we would list the following:

1. An apparent failure to deal adequately with the Greek term *stasis* itself. After briefly citing five etymologies mentioned by a Fifth-Century commentator on Hermogenes and declaring them all to be wrong, one worse than the other, Volkmann proceeds immediately to tell his readers what the concept involves, "leaving aside the literal meaning of the term."[3] By so doing Volkman misled himself as well as those who followed him. In his 1885 revision, he derives his entire conception and interpretation of *stasis* from the late Latin description *"quod in ea causa consistit"*;[4] he abandons all etymological explanations as unsatisfactory, gives no account of the Greek word, and discusses the concept as though it might as well have been termed *Qameç-chatuph* or *Begatkepat*. Might not this have been a mistake? In spite of the objection which some might raise, namely, that terms are significant by convention only and may be assigned to things arbitrarily and without any 'reason,' it would still seem not wholly unreasonable that the Greeks had meaning for their word. Rarely, if ever, does it happen that an existing word is arbitrarily used to denote an object unrelated by analogy or by metaphor to its basic and recognized denotation.

2. Similarly, it would seem that little effort has been made to relate the stasis-concept to Greek thought and culture. That Roman surveyors defined *status* as *uniuscuiusque altitudo*,[5] that Ptolemy (II A.D.) in his *Tetrabiblos*[6] used the term *stasis* to designate the four phases, or aspects, of the moon, that

[3] Volkmann, R., *Hermagoras*, p. 16: *"Sehen wir ab von der Wortbedeutung des Ausdrucks. . . ."*

[4] Volkmann, R., *Die Rhetorik*, p. 38.

[5] *Die Schriften der Roemischen Feldmesser*, Bluhme, F., Lachmann, K., u. Rudorff, A. F. ed., (Berlin, 1848-52), I, p. 373, 2.

[6] Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, edited and translated into English by F. E. Robbins, L.C.L., Harvard, 1915, p. 73.

Aristoxenus,[7] a pupil of Aristotle, described a *tasis,* i.e., a melodic pitch, or a vocal tone as a *monē kai stasis* of the voice, and that one of the few extant lines of a Seventh or Sixth Century (B.C.) Greek lyric poet, Alcaeus, reads: "I cannot understand the *stasis* of the winds"[8]—these and similar facts seem never to be mentioned in the discussions of the possible meaning of the rhetorical term. Instead there would seem to be a sort of a tacit belief, a kind of an unexpressed understanding among those who know, that the rhetorical *stasis* is wholly unique, separate, and distinct, not related to any other thing, that it sprang full bloom from one man's mind, and that his reason for designating it *stasis* was wholly esoteric and past all finding out.

3. As a third rather interesting characteristic of all previous investigations, one might mention the apparent presumption that *stasis is Stoic in origin.* Since, as Quintilian (III, vi, 3) informs us, some rhetoricians credited Naucrates with having invented the theory of *stasis,* and since Naucrates very probably lived in the Third Century, B.C., and since this was the time of the older Stoics, it seems simply to have been taken for granted that the doctrine must be Stoic in origin. But surely not everyone living in the Third Century, B.C., was a Stoic, and surely even the Stoics inherited some things from their predecessors.[9]

4. In 1904 Walter Jaeneke finally provided evidence that Plato, Aristotle, and the Peripatetic school had supplied some of the materials and terms utilized in the details of the stasis-theory. But not even Jaeneke seems to have considered the advisability of a more intensive and comprehensive investigation; he confined his research to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Organon;* and Lehnert,[10] who reviewed Jaeneke's dissertation in 1905, was very well satisfied with it and gave not the faintest suggestion that the rest of the Aristotelian corpus also might profitably be consulted.

5. Finally, a critical reader of the extant studies on the origin and meaning of stasis might observe that very little use has been made of the one rhetorical treatise which is most highly commended by critical students. Most scholars from Susemihl to Stroux agree that the brief treatise long ascribed to St. Augustine, but since 1905 commonly recognized as the Pseudo-Augustinian rhetoric,[11] is our most reliable source of pure Hermagorean rhetoric.[12] This rhetoric contains a very interesting explanation of *status.* Volkmann quoted it in Latin without comment;[13] Jean Cousin made but slight use of it;[14]

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[7] *The Harmonics of Aristoxenus* by Henry S. Macran, (Oxford, 1902), pp. 104 and 174.
[8] *ALKAIOY MELE, The Fragments of the Lyrical Poems of Alcaeus,* Edited by Edgar Lobel, (Oxford, 1927), p. 47.
[9] Kroll, W., *Rhetorik,* 26, p. 43.
[10] Lehnert, G., in *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift,* 16 September, 1905, pp. 1173-1176.
[11] Zurek, J., *De S. Aurelii Augustini praeceptis rhetoricis.* Dissertationes philol. Vindobonenses, VIII, 1905.
[12] Radermacher, L., *Hermagoras,* in Pauly Real-Encyclopadie, 1913, VIII, p. 693.
[13] Volkmann, R., *Die Rhetorik,* p. 106.
[14] Cousin, Jean, *Etudes,* p. 177.

later, a German scholar published his wholly negative conclusion that no clear meaning could be derived from it.[15] Yet, his failure to discover a good meaning does not overthrow the presumption that the text does make sense. The particular passage is the opening sentence in Section 12.[16] It advances a unique explanation why that which some rhetoricians designated as the *Quaestio* has by others been called *status*, namely: *ab ea videlicet quod in ea et exordium quaestionis et summa consisteret,* that is to say, "from the fact, obviously, that the beginning as well as the 'summa' of the question consists in it." The author sensed that the remark required an explanation and straightway supplied it. His explanation is very clear in itself, but it is rather difficult to see how it explains the original statement. The question arises: Whence did Pseudo-Augustine obtain this statement? Was it written in Latin or in Greek? What was the original version of the text? What did it mean? Meagre as this evidence is and difficult as it may be to interpret, it deserves more careful and serious consideration.

In this study, I have, accordingly, tried to avoid such shortcomings of research. I have attempted to examine the original meanings of *stasis* and to interpret it historically in the light of concepts logically related to it. In this way, I hope to lay the foundation for a more correct understanding of the concept.

I.

To begin with, *stasis* is not an untranslatable term. The complaint that there is no equivalent for it in a modern language is never voiced except by English scholars. Every student of Indo-Germanic philology knows that *stasis,* as well as *status,* comes from the root STA, *to stand.* It is a short root, admirably well suited for heavy duty. In ancient Greek its verbal forms have been made to serve in as many different senses as does the verb *to stand* in modern English; as an example illustrating an additional peculiarly Greek use of the verb in a causative meaning, we may cite Aristotle, 16b20, "The speaker *stops* the *dianoia*" (Cf. also, 100a1, 230a4, 247b10-18, and 407a33).

The noun *stasis* has likewise found a variety of uses. The stall in which the horses stood was to the Greeks a *hippostasis;* they spoke of the *stasis* of the wind, the *stasis* of the water, the *stasis* of the air, the *stasis* of the bowel, and of the *stasis* of politics. Plato *(Cratylus,* 426d) clearly explains *stasis* as the *apophasis* of *ienai,* i.e., the negative of the verb *to go,* the opposite of walking, going, or moving, that is to say, as a standing still. Aristotle likewise in his *Progression of Animals* speaks of the origin of the movement *(kinēsis)* of each of these parts and also of their *stasis* (706b23). In general, the Greek

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[15]*KOINE NOESIS* in one of the standard philological journals; I have been unable to relocate it and would appreciate assistance.
[16]Halm, Karl F., *Rhetores Latini Minores,* (Leipzig, 1863), p. 144.

term seems to have been used very much as it is used by modern physicians who commonly speak of hemostasis, renal stasis, intestinal stasis, stasibasiphobia, etc.,[17] and are therefore somewhat surprised to hear that the term is causing rhetoricians trouble. Truly, stasis doesn't need to be translated into English by rhetoricians: it has already become a perfectly good modern English word, defined by Webster as meaning "a standing still." It is Greek in origin, to be sure, but like kinesis and crisis and many others, it has been received into modern terminologies. Originally and basically, *stasis* is synonymous with *ĕremia* (Heraclitus A 6), i.e., a rest; it equals the English stasis, a standstill, or a standing still, the German *Stillstand*,[18] or, as Plato said (*Cratylus* 426d), the apophasis of *ienai,* and (*Sophist* 251d) the opposite of motion of any kind.

II.

When we look for stasis in ancient thought and culture, we seem to find it everywhere. *Kinĕsis* and *stasis* are generally accepted contraries in Greek thought and first principles applicable to most if not to all things (*Sophist* 251d; Aristotle, 1004b29; 1013b17-25; in Latin, Varro, *De Lingua Latina*, V, ii, *motus et status*). Since kinesis is a broad concept, explained by Aristotle (251a9; 1065b5; 1066a2ff.) as the actualization of any potentiality as such, stasis must also be interpreted broadly as the opposite of any such actualization. By observation Aristotle establishes that many such actualizations take place in this world, e.g., "Air changes into water and water back into air, an animal comes to be, a child grows, stones are made into an altar and bricks into a house, a white thing gets black, a body falls, a man forgets or acquires knowledge, and he walks from Athens to Thebes."[19] Associated with each such actualization there is a corresponding stasis. Since there is also such an actualization as an *amphisbĕtĕsis*—Aristotle's standard expression for argument, or debate—there must also somehow be associated with it a stasis and likewise with every practice, for (1222a29) every *praxis* is an actualization.

Actualizations occur, or take place in four and only four categories, viz., *Being, Quantity, Quality,* and *Place*. Actualizations in Being are called *metabolai*, i.e., 'changes'; opposite 'changes' are progressions toward and away from, or into and out of positive *Existence,* or *Being (ousia)*. Actualizations in *Quantity, Quality,* and *Place* are styled *kinĕseis,* i.e., 'motions' or 'movements'; and contrary 'motions' are progressions from A to B and from B to A, when A and B are contraries such as, for example, up and down, back

[17] Medical Dictionaries, e.g., Gould's or Dorland's, (Philadelphia, 1943).

[18] *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* von Hermann Diels, I, 145, 29. *Wortindex* verfasst von Walther Kraus, (Berlin, 1937), p. 401: *Stasis, Stillstand, syn. ĕremia, Herakl, A6.*

[19] Barrett, William, *Aristotle's Analysis of Movement: Its Significance for its Time,* Columbia University Dissertation, (New York, 1938), p. 12.

and front, right and left. "One movement is contrary to another, only if the terminal points of the former are spatially contrary to those of the latter. If, e.g., A is above and B below, or A right and B left, or A front and B back, then a movement from A to B is contrary to a movement from B to A." (336a18; H. H. Joachim, Aristotle *On Coming-To-Be and Passing-Away*, Oxford, 1922, p. 257). Vertical motion is not contrary to horizontal motion: (262a12, Ross,[20] p. 712) they are different genera, or kinds, of motion. Between opposite 'changes' as well as between contrary 'motions' of the same specific kind of one and the self-same subject there must needs always be stasis. For the purposes of this investigation, it will be well for us to note particularly (224b30) "that a 'change' may start *ek tou metaxy*, i.e., from an intermediate between contraries, because for the purpose of change the intermediate can be treated as opposed to either extreme, so that it may be regarded as a kind of a contrary to them and they to it." Likewise, it will be well for us to bear in mind (229b14-21) "that movements to something between such opposites as have anything between them are to be regarded in a sense as movements towards one or the other opposite; for the movement either way—from a state between to either opposite or from either opposite to a state between—makes the state between function as the opposite from which it is receding or toward which it is approaching as the case may be. . . . For in a sense that which is between *(to gar meson)* is so called in contrast with either extreme." *(Cornford,[21]* II, p. 69ff.) Emulating the method used by Aristotle himself (89b34) we might at this time establish by observation that rhetoricians in their praxis actually *amphisbētein*, argue, or debate, 'changes' as well as 'contrary motions,' and hence must necessarily also be concerned with *staseis*.

The further one reads Aristotle's physical science the better one understands stasis. The things with which physical science deals are the things which are 'constituted by nature'; these are the things which have the principle of *kinēsis* and *stasis* in themselves (192-b14). The matters with which the productive sciences, or the arts, concern themselves, e.g., bedsteads and garments and all other things manufactured, or 'made,' are not 'constituted' by nature; the principle of *kinēsis and stasis* is not in them, but in their producer, or maker. The efficient cause, however, of anything is that in which this principle is found, be it the seed, the doctor, the advisor, or in general, the agent (195-a23)

For a more particularized understanding of the physical concept, we must turn to Aristotle's doctrine of motion as set forth in Books V-VIII of his *Physics*. In 228b7 we learn that stasis is that which disrupts, or severs motion and robs it of its continuity. In 261-b18 we are told that in contrary motions,

[20]Ross, W. D., *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford, 1936). Cf. also Cherniss, Harold Frederik, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore, 1935).
[21]Wicksteed, Philip H. and Cornford, Francis M., *Aristotle, The Physics*. L.C.L. Harvard, 1929 and 1934.

one motion may be considered the contrary of the other as well as the contrary of the intervening stasis, but that no motion can ever exist simultaneously either with the stasis or with its contrary motion. All 'two-way' motions must occur consecutively.

Lastly, in Book VIII, 8ff. we find the following illuminating information:

1. 261b27. The only infinite movement in this world that can possibly be single and continuous is circular movement. For everything that is moved locally is moved either in a circle or on a straight line, or in a compound of the two, so that if one of the two simple movements is discontinuous, so is the composite. Now it is clear that that which moves in a straight line does not move continuously; for it turns back on itself and therefore moves with contrary movements: up and down, forward and backwards, or left and right (Cf. Ross, p. 446).

2. 262a12. That rectilinear movement cannot be continuous is most clearly shown by the fact that when it turns back, it must necessarily stand still (anankaion stēnai).

3. 262a17. That it must necessarily come to a stop (hoti d' anankē histasthai) is clear not only from observation, but also by argument. For there are three things, beginning, middle, and end, and the middle is beginning relatively to the end and end relatively to the beginning (pros ekateron amphō estin); it is one in number but two in definition (Cf. Ross, p. 446-447).

4. "all' ou pasa stasis ēremia estin, all' hē meta kinēsin," wrote Simplicius, (Commentaria in Aristotelem, IX, p. 264), i.e., "not every stasis is a rest, but that only which is after movement." We note that in the opposite or contrary movements from A to B and B to A, the stasis at B is not a rest in Simplicius' definition of the term: it does not occur 'after movement', but 'between movements'. Movement that is interrupted by stasis (whether it be movement on a straight line, or on a line bent back at some sharp angle (1016a14), is not one, but two movements, (264a21) and like the meson in which it occurs, this stasis is not a part of either movement, but a 'thing-in-between' and as such functionally (229b15) the contrary, or opposite, of both. The stasis does not indeed terminate motion though it is the terminal point of the first movement, for it is disturbed and counter motion begins before it has attained duration. Likewise, stasis is not a motion, though in a sense it is the point, or moment, of change. Since what a thing is, is determined by the function which it performs (390a10), stasis at B is neither an ēremēsis nor a kinēsis, but the station in which the mobile stands and turns. Since nothing can be at rest 'in a moment' any more than it can be in motion, this stasis is nothing permanent, but a transitory state, a temporary standing in conflict, undecided and wavering, between contrary impulses: ultimately, it must follow one or the other and become either an ēremēsis, or the movement contrary to the movement after which it has occurred (kinēsis enantia kinēsei).

We conclude that the stasis of Aristotle's physical science is the

unavoidable and indispensable concomitant of all opposite and contrary rectilinear motions. It is the event which must necessarily occur in-between opposite movements of one subject on a straight line as well as in-between contrary movements of a subject on a line deflected at an angle of more than 90 degrees. It is immobility, or station, which disrupts continuity, divides motion into two movements, and separates the two from one another; it is both an end and a beginning of motion, both a stop and a start, the turning, or the transitional standing at the moment of reversal of movement, single in number, but dual in function and in definition. Because it lacks duration, it is neither a rest, nor a motion, but an opposite, or contrary, of both: a dichotomic, bi-functional entity and concept comparable and analogous to the moment in time which we conceptualize whenever we make a particular 'now' the dividing point between time-past and time-to-come (222a10).

III.

What light does this Aristotelian doctrine of kinesis and stasis shed on the rhetorical stasis as presented by Pseudo-Augustine?

1. Let us recall that there is no such thing as motion in the abstract; without a thing being moved (200b32) there can be no kinesis of any kind, either simple or compound, no opposite or contrary movements either back and forth, this way and that way, or up and down, no *amphisbētēsis* either, nor any antagonistic motions between which stasis could occur. The terms are abstractions which the mind makes for theoretical purposes (100a12); actually there is no *kinēsis* apart from a *pragma*, no *noēsis* apart from a *noēton*, no *amphisbētēsis* apart from an *amphisbētēma*, no *zētēsis* apart from a *zētēma*, etc. The abstractions never occur, never exist, never have being, except as individual, particular, concrete actualities: every *kinēsis* is some particular, specific motion, or movement, of some one thing by another; every *amphisbētēsis* is an actual individual two-way movement in thought and speech of some one specific thing by opposite or contrary-minded speakers. And what of *stasis?* Can it 'stand alone,' or be of and by itself? Just as every kinesis is a motion of a specific thing so every stasis is an individual event, a real occurrence involving specific things, surrounded and supported by specific things which collectively are referred to as its *peristasis* and individually are designated as its *peristaseis*, or circumstances. The things which surround, envelop, or are involved in the opposite, or contrary movements are the things likewise which are involved in the intervening stasis. Any doctrine, theory, or system of rhetorical *amphisbētēseis* or *staseis* must therefore take its beginning from and be founded in the *peristaseis*. "Everything depends on the circumstances." This explains the important role which *peristaseis (circumstantiae)* play in Pseudo-Augustine's presentation of the rhetorical status.

2. Like all productive sciences, or arts, rhetoric, too, is in part *Noēsis* and in part *Poiēsis* (1032b15). *Noēsis* may also be termed Deliberation, Analysis,

or Zetesis, i.e., deliberate examination, investigation, or analysis (1112b20). "In all our inquiries we are asking whether there is a middle *(ei esti meson)* or what the middle is *(ti esti to meson)*: for the middle *(to meson)* is the cause *(to aition)* and it is the cause that we are seeking in all our inquiries (90a5)." Since rhetors serve their clients by 'handling' or 'managing' their *amphisbēteseis* for them, rhetors must in the zetetic phase of their rhetorical function also seek the *stasis* which is the *meson* of the *amphisbētēsis*. This *meson* is the 'thing sought in the investigation,' or the *zētēma* in the zetesis.

3. If we would think and speak of an *antiphasis* (17a33), i.e., a pair of contradictories, or a set of contrary statements, as an *amphisbētēsis*, i.e., a two-way movement, or motion, in thought and speech this way and that way, backward and forward, or upward and downward (261b27), we must also recognize the logical postulate that there must be a *stasis* within it. Without a *stasis* there can be no such *amphisbētēsis*. The *meson*, or middle[22] of every such *amphisbētēsis* must necessarily be a *stasis*. If we conceive of the movements in thought and speech which constitute an *amphisbētēsis* as opposite or contrary movements in the vertical dimensions, or upward and downward, the *meson*, or *stasis*, is the beginning of the later as well as the end of the earlier movement (262a21), or the finishing point as regarded from below as well as the starting point as regarded from above (262b28-263a1ff), or as Pseudo-Augustine expressed himself, *"in ea et exordium quaestionis et summa consisteret."* The thought may be paraphrased thus: This which some rhetoricians style *Zetema*, or *Quaestio*, because it is the *meson*, or *media*, i.e., the thing sought in the rhetorical *zētēsis*, has by others been designated as *stasis*, or *status*, for the obvious reason that it is the *meson*, or *media*, of the *amphisbētēsis* being investigated and as such must be a *stasis;* that it is both a *meson* and a *stasis* is indicated by the fact that both the beginning and the end or the "peak" of the *amphisbētēsis*, as well as of the *zētēsis*, stands still, or consists in it.

4. Applying Aristotle's terminology to Pseudo-Augustinean rhetoric we might say: In every complete *amphisbētēsis* there are three things: beginning, middle, and end. The middle is end relative to the beginning and beginning relative to the end; it is numerically one, but dual in function. In terms of vertical dimensions, the middle *stasis* is the point of reversal, that in which both the end of the prior upward motion and the beginning of the subsequent downward motion co-exist, consist, or stand still together. Between all opposite, or contrary, motions, movements, functions, or actions, there must needs always be stasis.[23] The *stasis*, or the *meson*, is the *aition*, or the proximate

[22]Thonssen, Lester and Baird, A. Craig, *Speech Criticism* (New York, 1948), p. 93: "The concept of the status, or the location of a center of argument." These authors are the first writers in centuries expressly to reassociate *stasis* with the *meson*. If we consider the movement of debate as a continuum, *stasis* is the *meson*, or *metaxy*, the *media*, middle, or 'in-between,' i.e., the center of the argument.

[23]Caisson, Stanley, *Progress and Catastrophe* (New York, 1937), p. 208. Mayo, Elton, *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Boston, 1945), p. xiii.

cause, of any both-way movement, and hence also of an *amphisbētēsis*. Since in rhetorical *noēsis* we investigate an *amphisbētēsis* to find its middle, or its cause, the 'thing sought in the *zētēsis*,' i.e., the *zētēma* and the *stasis* of the *amphisbētēsis* are identical and the terms may well be used synonymously and interchangeably.

Our conclusion is that the *status* described in Pseudo-Augustine's *Vorlage* is the *stasis* of earlier Greek rhetoric, a Peripatetic adaptation to rhetoric of the *stasis* of Aristotelian physics and is, therefore, to be understood as a metaphoric use of a clear and precise term of physical science.

IV.

Rhetoricians found Aristotle's physical philosophy, specifically his theory of motion of which stasis is an integral part, eminently useful for their purposes.

A. It provided the condition for a scientific theory of rhetoric. If in this world *panta rhei aei*, that is to say, everything always is only in continuous flux and change, it would indeed seem to be poorly suited and ill-adapted for logical and rhetorical purposes. If in passing from the Lyceum to the marketplace, Koriscos not only changes his incidental relationships, but also his essential identity (219b22), any course of action which implied personal responsibility and accountability, though it might be practically useful and expedient, must, strictly speaking, be considered pseudo-scientific, at best, a kind of 'as if' procedure. The rhetoric which had been developed in harmony with the philosophy of eternal change was sophistic rhetoric: unreal, superficial, illogical, and unscientific, designed only to achieve "persuasion" by any means, and wholly inadequate in the mode of logical proof (1354a).

The world of Aristotle's physical philosophy, in contrast, provided the necessary basis and prerequisities for scientific thinking and speaking, logic and rhetoric. It was a world in which, in addition to circular motions, or movements, there were also rectilinear motions, or movements "on a straight line." There is not only *metabolē* and *kinēsis* in this world, but also *stasis*. Since all subjects of whatever kind of motion are more concrete and more comprehensible in stasis than they are in motion, it was the concept of stasis that appealed particularly to the rhetoricians. In the long struggle of rhetoric with philosophy, as reflected, for example, in the comic fragments of Epicharmus,[24] it was Aristotle's doctrine of motion and stasis that gave rhetoricians the ultimate basis for their art. Reinforced by the dictum of the Stagirite (265a3-12, . . . those physicists are mistaken who say that all objects of sense are always in motion . . .), every rhetorician could henceforth, even in the presence of his old foes, boldly lift up his head and raise his voice.

[24]Kaibel, Georg, *Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, I, 1, (Berlin, 1899). Norwood, Gilbert, *Greek Comedy* (London, 1931), pp. 83-113.

B. The philosophy which provided the *sine qua non* of a scientific rhetoric also provided a theoretical background for such a rhetoric. Briefly, it was this: Rhetoric is a composite and a hybrid art.

(1) The things with which rhetoric deals may in a sense be said to be 'physical,' or 'natural,' for they have a 'physical' generation in that they 'arise' or 'grow out of' natural circumstances and events; hence, they may also be said to have a 'nature.' In a sense, then, rhetoric is a natural, a physical, or a *meta*-physical science. The rhetorician is a *'physikos'* in that he "selects perceptible and changeable substance, and studies it in respect to the movement or to the other forms of change to which it is liable; he studies a part only of the real and investigates that part not *qua* real, but *qua* change-able." For "the part of the real which the *physikos* studies is 'composite substance' *(synthetos ousia),* i.e., a union of two elements, concrete of form and matter, and thus secondary and derivative in its being." (H. H. Joachim, *On Coming-To-Be,* pp. xviii, xix, xxxi).

(2) The things with which rhetoric deals are things done or things to be done, practical things; it is a practical science.

(3) Finally, rhetoric is a productive science, or an art, for it attains its specific purpose in making speeches concerning either things that have been done or things that ought to be done in life (192b8 and 1025b1ff), i.e., motions, movements, or actions.

Like all artificial production, rhetorical activity consists of two processes: *Noēsis* (Cogitation) and *Poiēsis* (Production proper).

The subject matter of both phases, or functional processes of rhetoric, is a stasis, that is to say, a temporary standing between contradictories or contrary statements, or a thing temporarily 'divided' between contrary willed and hence contrarily thinking, speaking, and acting agents.

In the process of rhetorical Noesis, Zetesis, or Analysis, the rhetor investigates the stasis professionally. Deliberately he inquires whether or not there is in the matter before him any valid rhetorical stasis. He 'thinks the matter through' and 'realizes the stasis intellectually,' as that in which the *amphisbētēsis,* or argument, ends and begins, or as we would say, begins and ends, i.e., wholly consists. Such a professional examination will reveal that every proposed matter is either asystatic, synestotic, or stasiastic. Only stasiastic matters are fit subjects for rhetorical treatment; astasiastic, or astatic, matters must be carefully avoided in the interests of a successful representation. The most common of the astatic and perhaps the easiest to detect are the asystatic, for these matters lack integration, completeness, unity, coherence; they are not 'whole,' but incomplete, irrational, alogical, unrelated and disassociated accumulations merely of useless materials, or *phlegmata,* i.e., 'unconstituted' excretions (539a18) of a body, in which there is no 'life,' and hence they are utterly worthless and unusable for rhetorical purposes. Of these, ancient rhetoric recognized two classes, the second having three types.

1. A matter which is lacking in essential *peristaseis* is asystatic because of its incompleteness; the known, or knowable, circumstances do not

constitute a perfect whole, do not provide a continuous medium for any movement; matters of this kind may be said to be inchoate, unfinished, imperfect, atelic.

2. Even though essential *peristaseis* are present in a matter, adequate in number and of the proper quality and kind, it may yet be asystatic if the movements in which the circumstances are involved do not meet specific requirements. a) A matter may be asystatic *kat' isotēta,* i.e., due to the 'likeness' of the movements involving the circumstances. Actually there are no two movements, but only one, in matters such as these: both parties direct one and the same motion at one another, due to the peculiarity of the circumstances anything said by the one party can with equal validity be said also by the other; these 'rasps' or 'saws' cut both ways equally well and it is impossible to detect a critical difference between the 'two' movements. b) A matter may be asystatic *kath' heteromerean,* i.e., due to its one-sidedness; for the purposes of a possible defensive movement all the circumstances are "on the other side," the *peristaseis* admit only one movement, not two. c) Lastly, a matter may be asystatic due to a difficulty involved in it. Critical analysis of a matter of this kind reveals an *aporon,* i.e., an aporia. The movements in a matter such as this are so indistinct, unstable, fluctuating, and confusing that it is impossible for any one to find a logical way through it. These are the *asystata* which the examining rhetor must be quick to recognize and to reject; their rhetorical inadequacy is associated either with the *peristaseis* or with the movements in the circumstances.

Matters which in Noesis are found not to be asystatic in either of these four ways are said to be synestotic, i.e., essentially complete, cohesive, coherent, and unified. But they need not for that reason be yet suitable for rhetorical treatment. The movements 'over,' 'around,' 'about,' or 'in' the circumstances may all be compatible with one another, i.e., progressively complementary one to the other either along one and the same straight line, or at angles less than 90 degrees. Like the tributaries of a river,[25] each individual movement makes its contribution to the whole and all merge and blend with one another so that there is no difference between them but all become one. In modern terminology we would say that these matters are fit subjects for discussion, but not for debate. Finally, the professional investigator will recognize certain synestotic matters which in truth and in fact are stasiastic: the *peristaseis* in these matters are essentially complete and adequate and the movements involving the circumstances are either diametrically opposite or at least 'anakamptically' contrary one to the other: these, *kat' exochēn,* are proper and fit subjects for the professional rhetor's praxis.

In eventual developments of this kind there will be "fighting language," or "a war of words" *(onomatōn stasiasantōn, Cratylus,* 438d) in that some

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[25]Dewey, John, *Art as Experience* (New York, 1934), p. 41.

aver that *they* express the truth while others insist that *they* do and hence a criterion other than words will be required in accordance with which decision may be made between them.[26] In these encounters the parties are "not unanimous concerning a matter of some magnitude" (1167a22); they are not "like-minded" (1241a28), they do not "speak the same way, or say the same thing" (*mē homologoumena,* 1135b28, 1280a19, 1358b31, 1363b6); they '*stasiazein,*' i.e., 'make stasis' with one another and 'fight' (*machountai,* 1241a28), in that they make conflicting statements about one and the same matter and say of a self-same thing that it is both so and not so; hence, they *amphisbētein* (1010b20, 1280a19, 1299a29, 1300b27, 1281a9, 1363b6, 1358b31), putting 'pressure on one another' (1167a22), the one attacking and the other defending (1358b12).

Having 'discovered' and probed the stasis in the matter before him, the rhetorician proceeds to inquire of what 'nature' or kind the stasis is (89b34). He classifies the stasis according to the classification which rhetorical theory has developed after the pattern of Aristotle's classification of 'changes' and 'contrary motions in *Quantity, Quality,* and *Place*' and ultimately applies to it proofs from the topics which rhetoric has devised for his purposes.

Corresponding to the diametrically opposite 'motions,' or 'changes' (*metabolai,* 227a7, 229a9, 264b14), which Aristotle had distinguished in the Category *Being,* rhetoricians recognized a stasis between contradictory allegations of factuality which they designated *stasis stochasmos,* or *status conjecturalis,* with reference to the claims of being and nonbeing between which it intervenes. (According to Quintilian III, vi, 53, some styled it *genesis;* Theodorus, according to Ps.-Augustine, 9, spoke of it as *peri tēs ousias,* i.e., *de substantia,* or *concerning Being).* Graphically, this stasis in 'change' may be represented, thus:

The three components depicted are: 1. A motion, or movement, toward one positive goal, i.e., *Existence*, an affirmative allegation, or a positive declaration as of fact, such as, "It is a fact that John hit Mary." 3. A motion or movement, away from the same positive goal, i.e., a negative statement of fact, a denial of factuality, such as, e.g., "It is not a fact that he hit her." 2. The 'standing-in-between' the diametrically opposite assertions, or the central station of opposite movements which cannot be indicated either in a graph or in words without presenting the conflicting vectors between which it is located, viz., "he hit her" ∧ "he did not." Realizing the incompatibility of the two declarations, the mind, in doubt, converts these original motions into: 1. "Is it a fact that he hit her?" 3. "Or isn't it?" 2. The articulation: "Did he hit her, or not?"

On an abscissa representing time the stasis in 'change' may be graphed, thus:

The opposite motions are (1) from zero (0) to plus (+) and (2) away from plus (+); no minus (-) is involved, i.e., no negative opposite to the positive goal.

In a modified graph of a function, the stasis appears as the cusp:

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
Let OS+ represent the affirmation and +SO the negation: the station, or stasis, is at S.

Analogous to the physical counter 'motions' which Aristotle had differentiated in the Categories *Quality, Quantity,* and *Place,* (225b5-226a25), the new rhetoric recognized stases between contrary statements, or in altercations concerning *Quantity, Quality,* or *Place.* The three stases may be represented in one diagram thus:

or individually, thus:

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The three factors represented are: 1. A motion, i.e., an affirmation, or a declaration that a subject is positive in *Quantity, Quality,* or *Place.* 3. A motion, i.e., a negation, or a declaration that the subject is negative in *Quantity, Quality,* or *Place.* 2. The intervening stasis, or station central in the system of contrary motions, "It is so ⋀ It is not so."

In time, these three stases may be represented thus:

The motions are (1) toward the positive goal and (2) from the positive to the contrary negative. The stasis is at *S, between* the contrary motions AS and SB.

According to 229b1, these contrary movements may also be envisioned as passing either from the extremes to an intermediate or from the intermediate to the extremes. The rhetorical stases may accordingly also be represented as in either of the following diagrams:

For didactic as well as for practical purposes, rhetoricians arranged and combined the four categories of rhetorical kinesis and stasis into a progressive series, sequence, or system, which may be represented, as follows:

I. *Stasis-in-Being*

(Nothing is admitted, or waived.)

II. *Stasis-in-Quantity*

(*Being is* admitted, or waived.)

III. *Stasis-in-Quality*

(*Being* and *Quantity* are admitted, or waived.)

IV. *Stasis-in-Place*

(*Being, Quantity,* and *Quality* are admitted, or waived.)

(The light portions of the vertical figures indicate admitted, or waived matters; shaded portions represent areas of argument.)

Since Being is the principal category in Aristotelian logic, *Stasis* in *Being* is the first which the rhetor must consider in critically appraising a stasiastic matter; when he has satisfied himself that the stasis is not in *Being*, he inquires in turn whether it is in *Quantity, Quality,* or *Place.* To mistake, or misjudge the category of the stasis might seriously jeopardize a representation from the beginning, if not pre-determine its failure. A 'move' may be 'stasiated', i.e., 'stopped, converted, and repulsed' in from one to four ways; in every instance, however, it is the category of the counter-kinesis that determines the category of the stasis as well as the category of the resulting *amphisbētēsis;* in modern terms we might say that the category of the Answer "characterizes" (Cf. Walz, C., *Rhetores Graeci,* iv, 795, 18, and v, 592) the stasis as well as the argument-both-ways which results from it. The stasis (indicated by $\sum$ or $\bigwedge$ on the charts) is always the end, or peak of the first

'move' and the beginning of the second; hence, it is also a middle and the immediate, or proximate cause which generates, determines, and characterizes the consequent *amphisbētēsis*, or controversy, for every such *amphisbētēsis* starts as and from a stasis and 'grows out' of a stasis. In Stasis I, unqualified Being, or the subject's actual existence, is challenged, controverted, and rejected; there is no agreement whatever between the speakers on the subject and the area of dispute is considerable. In Stasis II, the subject's actuality or actual *Being* is admitted, or waived, but its quantification, or *Being-in-Quantity*, is checked, 'retorted' and denied and the area of disagreement is more limited. In Stasis III, the subject's *Being* and *Quantity* are admitted, or waived, but its qualitative *Being*, i.e., *Being-in-Quality* is 'arrested, re-directed, and repelled' and the extent of the dispute is correspondingly restricted. In Stasis IV, the subject's *Being, Quantity,* and *Quality,* are admitted, or waived; its *Being-in-Place* only is 'not allowed to pass,' but 're-turned' and 'hurled back.' To exemplify. The charge: "It is a fact that you stole my car," may be 'stasiated' and controverted entirely in *Being,* thus: "It is not a fact that I stole your car." Or, it may be denied and rejected in part only, i.e., quantitatively, thus: "That I stole your car is not a fact, I merely borrowed it." Again, the selfsame Charge may be 'stasiated qualitatively only,' thus: "That I stole your car is a fact, but under the circumstances it was a good thing that I did." Lastly, the Charge may be met, 'stasiated' and rebuffed by an Answer in the category of *Being-in-Place,* e.g., "It *is not in Place for you* to take this action, or to bring this charge *at this time,* or *in this court,* or *in this manner* etc." If the aggressive 'move' is not 'stasiated,' i.e., stopped, 're-volved,' and 're-jected,' either in *Being absolutely,* in *Being quantitatively,* in *Being qualitatively* or in *Being-in-Place,* there is no rhetorical stasis, no 'revolution,' and no *amphisbētēsis.* To *amphisbētein* is to make conflicting statements about a matter, to 'move,' or to argue it both ways; *ambigitur status* (Lucretius, III, 1074) means to activate a stasis from both sides, to agitate it, or to push it in contrary directions. To speak against a motion, to 'categorize' a statement, or to 'stasiate' a charge, is to negate, deny, or gainsay it, i.e., to say that it is not so either actually, quantitatively, or qualitatively, or to say that for some reason it is not in place.

We should note also that these four categories of rhetorical kinesis and stasis may be re-arranged, re-designated, widened or narrowed in scope, or further subdivided to suit the whims or wishes of any technical writer without in any way vitiating the essential character and validity of the stasis-theory in general.

V.

In the light of Aristotle's doctrine of physical kinesis and stasis certain statements by ancient rhetoricians concerning the stasis become more readily intelligible. For example, if we bear in mind the composite graph of the four basic stases, we have no difficulty in understanding how Cicero in *Tusculan Disputations,* III, 33, 79, could explain the term status with the parenthetic

statement, *sic enim appellamus controversiarum genera,* i.e., for so we rhetoricians designate the (three or four) kinds, or classes, of controversies. By synecdoche, stasis, or status, the name of the part comes to stand for the whole, and the thing comes to stand for the class or the classes of the thing.

Wholly meaningful and proper, also, becomes the language used by Cicero in his *Topica* 25, 93: *stasis . . . in quo primum insistit quasi ad repugnandum congressa defensio,* i.e., stasis is where (the place at which) the defense, set to meet the attack, first steps into the affray, so to speak, for the purpose of fighting back (or making a 'retort,' or staging a 'come-back'). The lines of action, as here presented by Cicero, are orientated as they are in Aristotle's *Physics:* it is at ᴧ that the prior motion comes to rest; the first speaker, i.e., the plaintiff, evidently intends his statement to be a final one, but his 'rest' is immediately disturbed, for the defendant, set, as it were, to meet the attack, steps in, puts his foot down, as it were, on the same ground, and insists on using the plaintiff's resting-place as the starting place of his contrary motion. Like the two brothers mentioned by Aristotle (1167a22, cf. Euripides, *Phoenissae,* 558), plaintiff and defendant both insist on having one and the same thing, each for his own purpose, both desire 'to have things their own way,' to rule, to dominate, to be supreme, and consequently, they *stasiazein,* or make stasis with one another, i.e., block one another, actualize a separation, or division, between them.

In the light of what has been set forth, we are able to appreciate the Latin term *constitutio* with which Roman rhetoricians interpreted the Greek *stasis.* The unknown *auctor ad Herennium* (I, 11, 8) described a rhetorical *constitutio* as the *prima deprecatio defensoris cum accusatoris insimulatione conjuncta,* i.e., the original deprecation of the accused joined with the accusation of the adversary. A *constitutio,* then, is a synthesis, a conjunction, co-stasis, or 'standing together' of specific statements, or declarations, between which there is an interval of conflict, or disagreement. The Latin term is analogous to the Greek *systasis* and a usable equivalent for both *systasis* and *systēma* as applied, for instance, in the theory of Greek music.[27] As authority for this use of the term, the *auctor* might also cite Aristotle, particularly in 646a8-647a5 where he discusses the processes of generation by which the various 'parts' of animal bodies are formed, or the 'aitia,' i.e.,

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[27]*The Harmonics of Aristoxenus,* by Henry S. Macran, p. 98 & 168. "An Interval *(diastēma)* is the distance bounded by two notes which have not the same pitch," I, 15, p. 176. "Compound intervals as a matter of fact are in a sense scales *(systēmasin),*" I, 5, p. 168. "A scale *(systēma)* is to be regarded as the compound of two or more intervals," I, 16, p. 108. "The number and character of the scales *(systēmata)* are deduced from the intervals," p. 168. See also, *Musici Scriptores Graeci,* Carolus Janus (Leipzig, 1895), p. 179, 7; 180, 2; 243, 4; 261, 19; 292, 18, etc. See also, Boetii, *De Institutione Musica,* Godofredus Friedlein (Leipzig, 1867), p. 341: "Constitutio vero est plenum veluti modulationis corpus." Macran, p. 168, translates *tēn tou melous systasin* with "the constitution of melody" and systema with *system,* or scale. Note also, the German: "Die Konstitution der Musik." For an illuminating discussion of the importance of the *mesē* in the systems of Greek music, see Schlesinger, Kathleen, *The Greek Aulos* (London, 1939), p. 182ff.

causes, by which these parts have come to be as they are. The first generative process, or cause is a *synthesis,* while the second and third are *systaseis.* A *synthesis* is a mere juxtaposition, or mechanical mixture of elements; the first *systasis* is a chemical combination in which the qualities of the components are transformed and a new, wholly homogeneous body is created; the final *systasis* is the bringing, or coming together and the resulting 'standing together' of contrary informations of a homogeneous matter to constitute a functional member, or an instrumental organ of the body, as for example, a femur and a tibia are articulated to form a leg.[28] A *systasis, systema,* or *constitutio,* then, is a constitution, a 'physical' nature, or a natural body, i.e., in rhetoric, the physical incorporation, natural organization, organic make-up, or vital system of a controversy.

In terms of this science, rhetoricians spoke of the *peristaseis* (Who? What? When? Where? How? Why? By what means?) as the *stoicheia,* or elements of a rhetorical matter. Essential and indispensable as these are, they must be used in the rhetorical processes as they are found in the 'nature' of the matter. Of, or out of these elemental matters, or elements are constituted a Charge and an Answer as contrary informations of one and the same matter. Of, or out of these homogeneous, but contrary 'parts' is constituted and comes into being a 'non-uniform,' or 'anomoiomerous' instrumental 'part,' or organ of function (378b19). This constitution of contrary information is a vital organon of motion (336a18); it can move, or be moved in opposite, or contrary motions; rhetorically, it can be argued, i.e., set forth and advanced in argumentative speeches, for it has (26a26-261a26 and 336a20) innately inherent within it an originative source of kinesis as well as of stasis, or an impulse to change (Cf. Joachim, *On Coming-To-Be,* p. xxi and 256), that is to say, it could go, or be made to go this way or that way, but presently it is in dire need of assistance, for due to its equally potent conflicting impulses it is actually in stasis, or (as automotive engineers say of reciprocating pistons) "at top dead center," wholly equilibrized, immobilized, and paralyzed, unable to move either way. It cannot decide, determine, or dispose itself; cannot 'turn over,' get started, set off, come through, determine its course and pursue it effectively, *(diatithesthai,* cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Rhetoricians.* II, 62); to do that is the work of the accomplished speaker, according to Hermagoras. The *constitutio* of the *auctor ad Herennium,* then, is the functionally dual *stasis* of Greek rhetoric interpreted mechanically, organically, physiologically, functionally, or bodily, as a part of a body, a member, a limb, or a joint in which there is both stasis and motion, as a *kampē* which Aristotle (702a22) described as the beginning of one thing and

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[28]Duering, Ingemar, *Aristotle's De partibus animalium* (Goeteborg, 1943), p. 125, and *Aristotle's Chemical Treatise, Meteorologica, Book IV,* 1944, p. 11.

Peck, A. L., Aristotle *Parts of Animals,* Book II, L.C.L. Harvard, 1937, p. 106ff.

Joachim, H. H., *Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away* (Oxford, 1922); also "Aristotle's Conception of a Chemical Combination" in *Journal of Philology,* 1904, pp. 72-86.

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the end of another constituting a *physikon sōma,* a bodily source and implement of motion (433b20 and 703a22), the psychical counterpart of which is the articulate question (1041b4), or, as Sextus Empiricus *(Against the Geometricians,* III, 4) styled it, the 'rhetorical' question. The implication clearly is that when rhetors deal with constitutions they are not dealing with elementary matters but with real existing things of considerable complexity and advanced development.

In terms of modern physics one might perhaps describe the *constitutio* of the auctor as the physical contrivance, or engine, by means of which, after it has been set into motion, rhetorical heat can be converted into oratorical energy and transmitted to the listener as the power of effective response.

In his first rhetorical treatise, the *De Inventione,* Cicero as a young man undertook to set forth in Latin his interpretation of the theory of Greek rhetoric which he had received from his teachers. As we read the text,[29] Cicero begins his exposition of rhetorical analysis by affirming his presumption concerning the genesis of a rhetorical matter: *Omnis res,* every real thing proposed for rhetorical action, in which there is observable a *controversia* of one of the four possible kinds, also has within it a *quaestio* of the same kind, out of which the controversy was generated, or developed. In other words, every *controversia* is a generation, a natural, organic development, an automotive, bilateral outgrowth from within, the outcome, product, and result of a generic process which starts from a vital center, a living nucleus, or an original stock; the antecedent of every *controversia* (←——→) is a *contraversio.*[30] (→←) Translated into terms of Aristotelian *Physics* (255b31-256a2), Cicero is here declaring that in every occurrence of 'contrary movements' thus, ↕ (or so, ←——→), as depicted in graphs A and B,—which may also be interpreted as 'contrary movements,' thus, ↑↓ (or so, ← →) as represented in graph D—there must necessarily also be 'counter movements,' thus, ⤨ (or so, ——→←——), as pictured in graph C, from which the evolution has proceeded. Further to elucidate Cicero's statement, we offer the following. In the generation of reciprocating motion which Cicero is discussing at least six moments, or stages, may be differentiated; represented in horizontal lines and described rhetorically, these moments might be visualized as follows, reading from the bottom, up:

6.　　　　←————→ : *amphisbētēsis, controversia.*
5.　　　　←— — — — : a reiterated Answer, intensified to controvert the
　　　　　　　　　　　restated Charge.

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[29]*De Inventione,* I, 8, 10ff., in Teubner edition by Ed. Stroebel, (Leipzig, 1915).
[30]Stroux, Johannes, *Contraversia, Philologus,* 84 (1929), pp. 368-376.

4. ⟶ : a renewed Charge, modified and intensified to controvert the Answer.

3. ⟶⟵---- : *stasis, zētēma, status, quaestio, prima conflictio.*

2. ⟵---- : an Answer in which there is a denial of the Charge.

1. ⟶ : a positive assertion, an incrimination, a Charge.

Or, these six moments might be visualized in vertical lines and exemplified, as follows:

6. : "I borrowed it." "You did not borrow it."

5. : "Most assuredly, I did borrow it."

4. : "You most certainly did not borrow it."

3. : "You stole it." "I borrowed it."

2. : "I did not steal, I borrowed it."

1. : "You stole my horse."

Both schematic representations indicate that 6 might be considered a development of 3; the secondary, or consequent ⟷ grows out of the primary, or antecedent ⟶⟵; the immediate, or proximate cause of the ↕ is the ↕; if there had not been a ↕ or a →←, no ↕ or ⟷ could have developed. Greek rhetoricians had designated the ultimate development as an *amphisbētēsis*, i.e., a going both ways, or a going apart; the antecedent configuration, they termed *stasis*. Every *amphisbētēsis*, the Greeks said, begins as and from a *stasis*; unless a *stasis* has occurred, no *amphisbētēsis* can begin to be. Roman rhetoricians, however, had accustomed themselves to think and speak of the final development in this process as a *controversia*,

that is, a controversy. Hence, the question arose: Could the term *status*, the Latin equivalent of the Greek *stasis*, properly be used in Roman rhetoric? Was it correct to say that a *controversia* developed from a *status*? Did a stop, or a standstill actually occur before the contrary statements controverted one another? Some Roman rhetoricians decided that the term could so be used; others preferred to describe as *quaestio* that out of which a controversy arises. The term *quaestio* however, in this context was also open to criticism: it was already being used in a bewildering number of different senses; its predominant connotation for the student was grammatical and syntactical; pedagogically, it would therefore be more correct to apply the term to the individual, or particular question in controversy (as Cicero does in *De Inventione*, I, viii, 18); above all, neither was the term *quaestio* well suited for use in a context with genesis, or generation. But how otherwise might one describe and designate this *stasis, meson, aition?* Or, this *zētēma?* This *media quaestio* out of which a *controversia* is generated? "We," wrote Cicero, "call this *quaestio ex qua causa nascitur,*" a *"constitutio."* The term clearly is a Latin equivalent for the Greek *systasis* and admirably meets the requirements of the specific context in which he uses it. That a configuration of forces which might be represented graphically thus, or so, ———→←———, should be called a *systasis,* or a *constitutio,* would seem intelligible to any educated Greek or Roman without argument. For the vectors obviously represent opposite, or contrary movements, or motions, on one and the same straight line, in head-on collision, meeting and stopping one another. Between such opposite, or contrary, *kinēsis,* or *motus,* there must needs be stasis, or status, single in number, but dual in function, a two-in-one, or a one-in-two. The two forces involved are clearly *"hama,"* or 'standing together' in the sense of 226b18; they are also *haptesthai,* or 'touching' in the sense of 226b25, i.e., 'standing in contact with one another' in that their extremes are 'together.' Clearly, then, this is not only a *stasis,* or a *status,* but also a *systasis* and a *constitutio,* i.e., a constitution in the sense of the formative, or generative action or process of constituting, as well as in the sense of the composite substance, or corporate being, concrete of matter and form, thereby constituted, made to consist, or brought into existence. That this terminology was well suited for use in context with generation and genesis may likewise easily be demonstrated.

In evidence, we present the following. (1) *Systasis* is a Greek noun, ending in *sis,* denoting a process; the verbs *synhistanai* and *synhistathai* are frequently used in Greek, also by Aristotle, closely associated with *genesis* and *gignesthai* (Cf. Aristotle *Generation of Animals,* A. L. Peck, L.C.L., Cambridge, 1943). From Peck's *Preface* we quote in part: (52) Genesis is a process of change; in fact, it is the most fundamental sort of change, viz., 'coming into being'; hence, the product resulting from a process of *genesis* is some *ousia* . . . (53) *Genesis* and its verb *gignesthai* are terms of frequent occurrence in Aristotle, and especially in *Generation of Animals.* In the title of the treatise, *genesis* is commonly translated "generation," and this is a convenient rendering of it there; but we must not forget that *genesis* also

refers to the whole process of an animal's development until it has reached its completion; that is to say, *genesis* includes the whole subject of reproduction and embryology. . . . I have therefore commonly used "formation," "process of formation," and the like to render *genesis* and for *gignesthai* "to be formed," "to come to be formed," etc. (54) Another verb closely connected with *gignesthai* is the verb *synhistanai*, which might almost be regarded as the active voice of *gignesthai*, though *synhistanai* tends rather to refer *to the beginning of the process*. (Italics mine.) It is especially frequent in passages describing the initial action of the semen in constituting a "fetation" out of the menstrual fluid of the female. . . . *Synhistanai* therefore denotes the first impact of Form upon Matter, *the first step in the process of actualizing the potentiality of Matter.* (Italics mine.) Sometimes I have used "constitute," sometimes "set," sometimes "cause to take shape"; and for *synhistasthai*, which is also very frequent, "set" (intransitive), "take shape," "arise," etc. (55) Another possible rendering would have been "organize"; and indeed "organizers" is a term which has recently been introduced into embryology to denote substances which are responsible for bringing about the differentiation of the parts of the embryo.

(2) Aristotle himself uses the noun *systasis* in a comparable sense with reference to living animals, cf. 766a25: And when one vital part changes, the whole make-up of the animal *(systasis tou zôou)* differs greatly, in appearance and form (Peck, p. 391).

(3) In 767b18ff., Aristotle gives an enlightening account of his use of the term "movement" in connection with genesis and generation: "It comes to the same thing whether we say the 'semen' or 'the movement which makes each of the parts grow'; or whether we say 'makes them grow' or 'constitutes' and 'sets' them from the beginning—because the *logos* of the movement is the same either way." (Peck, p. 403.)

(4) Most significant, perhaps, and influential in determining Cicero's choice and use of the term *constitutio* in his rhetoric, was the fact that Aristotle himself used the term *systasis*, or *systaseis*, in speaking of the primates, or the primeval forms of animal life mentioned by Empedocles as the aboriginal "crossbreeds" from which all present forms of animal life have been propagated. (199b5: Thus in the original combinations—*en tais ex archês ara systasesi*—the 'ox-progeny' if they failed to reach a determinate end must have arisen through the corruption of some principle corresponding to what is now the seed—*sperma*. Further, seed must have come into being first, and not straightway the animals: the words 'whole-natured first'— Empedocles, *Fragment* 62,4—must have meant seed. Ross, *Physics*, 199b.) As we know, e.g., from Fragments[1] #61 and #62, Empedocles had suggested a theory of prehistoric monsters, or primitive brutes, unmodified, mixed and contrary in form and nature, from which all present-day animals have

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[1]Diels, Hermann, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1934), p. 334.

developed. William E. Leonard[32] translates Fragment #62, as follows:

> Many were born with twofold brow and breast,
> Some with the face of man on bovine stock,
> Some with man's form beneath a bovine head,
> Mixed shapes of being with shadowed secret parts,
> Sometimes like men, and sometimes women-growths.

Aristotle (199b9-12) raised the question whether there had been such *systaseis* in plants also, e.g., 'olive-headed vine-progeny' comparable to the 'man-headed ox-progeny' in animals. He concluded that there must have been, if there were such things among animals. Young Cicero apparently had likewise concluded that there must have been and must be such things among controversies. Hence, he wrote in his *Rhetorica* about the *constitutiones causarum* or the *constitutiones controversiarum*, and never mentioned the term stasis, or status.

(6) The reader's special attention is invited to the terms *amphiprosōpa* and *amphisterna* ('double faces' and 'double fronts') in the Greek original. They may remind one of the *amphisbaina*, a fabulous monster which 'goes' either or both ways, perhaps with a head at each end, mentioned, e.g., by Aeschylus in *Agamemnon*, 1233. We may recall that the Greek verb *amphisbētein* and the noun *amphisbētēsis*, in use since the Fifth Century, became Aristotle's standard expressions for 'arguing' and 'argumentation.' Perhaps these terms, too, imply that 'controversies' are 'mixed shapes of being,' *'Mischwesen,'*[33] or mongrels. In his *De Inventione* Cicero recognized four such mongrel forms of conflict-life: Every; *pragma, res*, real thing, or being in which there is controversy is an individual modification of an original mongrel strain of controversy; every "live" controversy at any time is a current specimen, or an individual development, of one of these primordial forms: 1. You did ∧ I didn't. 2. You did this ∧ I did that. 3. You did this ∧ And a good thing it was. 4. You did this ∧ You are 'out of order.' Accordingly, Cicero did not perpetuate the Greek doctrine of the *asystata* and the *synestōta*, but dismissed them both with the statement (I, 10, 18-21): "And one or the other of these original forms must necessarily be represented in every present cause; a matter in which none of them is found, cannot possibly be considered a controversy, and for that reason neither a cause." It is in agreement herewith also that he explained the names of the categories of controversy in their relation to *Poiēsis*, or speechmaking, rather than to *Noēsis* (Cf. *De Inventione*, I, viii-xv).

Here in his introduction to rhetorical analysis Cicero has incidentally also proposed a new term for general use in Latin rhetoric, i.e., *constitutio* should be used for *quaestio* in certain contexts. That this change in terminology,

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[32]Leonard, William E., *The Fragments of Empedocles* (Chicago, 1908), p. 37.
[33]Diels, H., *Die Fragmente*, 1934, I, p. 334; in the 1903 edition, p. 200, he translates *"Mischgeschoepfe."*

however, did not imply any deviation in his theory, or basic thinking, becomes very clear from his subsequent remarks. "A constitution," he explains immediately, "is the original clash, or primary conflict of causes." Causes, according to 1013b25, are the origin, source, or beginning of every change and every stasis. Two causes of the same species, contrary in dynamis, are the origin, or beginning, of every natural stasis, or constitution: a cause of action and a cause of reaction, or reciprocation. The initial conflict of the causes is the constitution of the controversy. The superficial and observable moving apart or going asunder (←——— ———→) is the secondary phenomenon; the primary conflict with which the rhetor must concern himself first of all is the originative antagonistic standing ———→←———, or the genetic contrariness, in the immediate, or proximate causes of the whole development: no other understanding or analysis of a controversy is adequate for rhetorical purposes; no one can argue a controversery intelligently who does not thoroughly comprehend the conflict out of which it developed. This interpretation of a *Constitutio* is reiterated in I, xiii, 18: "The Question is the individual controversy which develops from the conflict in the causes, that is to say, e.g., the controversy: "You were not justified in doing it" "I was justified in doing it." The conflict of the causes is that in which the *constitutio* (or the 'standing together') consists, (i.e., not the *amphisbētēsis,* or the 'going apart'). Out of this conflict is born the controversy which we call the Question, e.g., in this case: "Was he justified in doing it, or not?"

Not even this 'primary' conflict, however, is without its genesis; it, too, had a generation by which it came into being and the nature of its generation is another strong reason why it should be called a *constitutio.* For the process by which it came to be as it is, was not a *synthesis,* or composition, out of elements, nor a *systasis,* or *constitution,* of contrary informations out of elemental matter, but a *systasis,* or the constitution of a heteromerous part out of contrary informations of the selfsame matter, as Aristotle himself had differentiated the processes in *Parts of Animals,* Book II. This *prima conflictio* which is the *constitutio "profecta ex depulsione intentionis,"* i.e., has come out of, emerged, or resulted from a *depulsio,* i.e., a de-motion, or a motion downward, a denunciation, or a denial, of an *intentio,* i.e., an up-rising, an anabatic, aggressive, presumptuous, attacking, and incriminating impulse, move, or act, commonly called a Charge. In other words, the primary conflict itself is a vertical reciprocation in formal speech. The causes of the conflict are the Answer and the Charge, contrary motions made orally, contrary functions performed rhetorically, either in unqualified contradictions (Cf. *De Interpretatione,* iv-vi) as when a 'change' is 'argued,' e.g., "It is a fact that you did this" ∧ "It is not a fact that I did it," or in contrary statements as, e.g., in "It is a fact that you did this" ∧ "I was justified in doing it."

In significant respects, then, according to Cicero, the genesis, or generation of a rhetorical subject—of which the reverse, or counterpart is a rhetorical analysis—is comparable, analogous, and like the generation of every other 'natural' physical being. The normal excitement, or turbulence, of

some one individual living being, A, is intensified by a matter, or a circumstance in a matter. This intensification causes A to make a concentrated Charge against another individual, B, e.g., "You did this." B's reaction to A's excitement is an attempt to allay, neutralize, or offset it. The Answer to A's Charge might, for example, be either: "I did not do it," or "I was justified in doing it." The immediate effect of such reciprocation is a stasis, the momentary cessation of all excitement, or movement, an interval, or a latent stage in the process of becoming. The two opposite, or contrary *dynameis*, however, have come into contact with one another and are now 'together.' Out of this vital contact, association, or relation, a fresh *arché* (192b9-11), a new beginning, or a new being originates (Ross, *Physics*, p. 500). Out of the *apophasis* as the material, the *kataphasis* as the formal principle constitutes the 'fetation' out of which the controversy grows. The new Being which develops from this constitution, or embryo, is a "cross between" the originals. Accordingly, the course, or process of generation, by which a rhetorical subject, or an arguable *res* comes to be, is a re-production which involves the collaboration and interaction of opposites, or contraries, of one and the same species; due to their innately inherent incompatibility, however, the *dynameis* of contradictory, or conflicting, statements are unable to blend and unite with one another to constitute a unified, harmonious, integrated, or whole body: that which is born of conflict must needs be merely a contraversion, or a controversy. Let us restate the matter, thus: To begin with there must be a *Kataphasis*, e.g., "You did this!," and an *Apophasis*, e.g., "I did not!" These two opposite movements, or contradictory declarations, constitute the *prima conflictio* out of which a *secunda controversia* develops; that is to say, out of the initial constitution arises a more potent and more emphatic new *Kataphasis*, e.g., "But you most certainly did," and likewise an intensified and more energetic new *Apophasis*, e.g., "I most assuredly did not!," and these two vitalized declarations exactly parallel and controvert one another. Or, in another instance, out of another original constitution, e.g., "You did this—I was justified in so doing," there may arise the new negative *Kataphasis:* "You were not justified in so doing" and the new positive *Apophasis:* "Most assuredly, I was justified in so doing." Thus, the 'start,' or the beginning of every rhetorical *pragma, res,* or real existing controversy is a Charge (*Kataphasis, Intentio*) and an Answer (*Apophasis, Depulsio,* or *Abnuentia*), or an Accusation and a Denial of the Charge. As opposites, or contraries, these declarations *stasiazein* with one another, make *stasis* with, or block one another, or effect the constitution of a conflict. This constitution, however, is not a final, but an initial, or an intermediary, 'sperm' stage in the process of becoming, or generation; it is alive and has the potentiality of ultimately developing, or being developed into a finished product. In its genetic development a new Charge arises out of the first Answer and a fresh Answer out of the old Charge; substantially neither is anything new, but merely a reiteration, restatement, or another version of the old. Accordingly, this 'generation' is actually a 're-generation,' or a transformed reproduction of the originals, merely a contra version of the initial conflict, not an

accomplished, or successfully terminated and completed generation, but an original product in the process of becoming, unfinished and undetermined as yet, but alive and capable of being cultivated and ultimately developed by extraneous, artificial, or artistic means. Due to the blemish inherent in the movements, or seeds (199b4) the 'parent statements' fail to reach, or arrive at any conclusion, or determined end. The real thing by them produced, or brought into being, though alive and potential, is actually and by nature ambiguous, doubtful, questionable, variable, contrary, controversial, unsettled, undetermined, nothing specific and decided, but merely a controversy to which there is as yet no end, or termination. Graphically, this 'crossbreeding' of a controversy might be depicted, thus: (Let 1. indicate the prior, and 2. the consequent, as the controversy is generated by and from the conflict.)

2.   "I did not!"   "You did, too!"

                    (controversy)
         Stasis, status, prima conflictio,
            seu constitutio.

1.   The Charge: "You did this"   "I did not!," the Answer
                   (the first conflict)

                       or

2.   "It was theft!"   "It was not theft!"
         Stasis, status, prima conflictio,
            seu constitutio.

1.   "You committed Sacrilege!"   "It was theft that I committed!"

                       or

2.   "It was a good thing!"   "It was not a good thing!"
         Stasis, status, prima conflictio,
            seu constitutio.

1.   "You burned my crops!"   "It was a good thing that I did."

                       or

2.   "It is not in Place!"   "It is in Place for me to proceed as I do."

Stasis, status, prima conflictio,
seu constitutio.

1.   "You wronged my father!"   "It is not in Place for you to proceed as you are doing!"

Even though his term *constitutio* was never generally accepted in Latin rhetorical theory and though he himself later reverted to the use of the term *status*, *Tusculan Disputations* III, 33, 79, and *Orator* 14 and 35 would seem to indicate that Cicero never changed his basic point of view in this regard. The main difference in their interpretations of the rhetorical *constitutio* consists in this: what the *auctor* described as a mechanical-physiological organ of rhetorical action, Cicero described as an 'original' form of conflict, a sort of primordial "cross-breed" of contrariness out of which the individual and particular controversy generates or is propagated. Finally, in the light of this research, the description of stasis ascribed to Hermagoras (Quintilian III, vi, 21) becomes wholly meaningful to us. Hermagoras represented stasis as that which in rhetoric performs a most important twofold function,[34] i.e., as that which serves as the guiding principle of both rhetorical Noesis and Poiesis. In rhetorical analysis the subject matter is intellectually laid hold upon, or 'grasped' and investigated logically with reference to its stasis, i.e., to determine whether it be asystatic, synestotic, or stasiastic, and if stastic, what type of stasis it exhibits. In speechmaking, the stasis is rhetorically 'handled,' 'managed,' or treated in two speeches: opposing rhetors present to a third party as the judge both a *synechon* and an *aition*, i.e., an argument why the stasis should be maintained and established permanently as well as a reason why it ought to be resolved in a contrary motion. Both speakers strengthen their causes with proofs drawn from the special *topoi* which rhetoric has devised for their use. The judge considers the stasis in the light of both the *synechon* and the *aition*, i.e., he weighs the *krinomenon*, or the thing to be judged, and in accordance with his verdict, reached with the cooperation of the rhetors, will be the final disposition, conclusion, end, or settlement of the stasis (Cf. *diatithesthai*, Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Rhetoricians* II, 62). Hence, it was from actual rhetorical practice that Hermagoras derived his functional description of stasis (Quintilian, III, vi, 21, and *Rhetores Graeci*, vii, 173 and v, 78, 10) as that (1) with reference to which a subject matter is investigated and analyzed in Noesis, and (2) that with reference to which (in Poiesis) both speakers must present arguments in their speeches.

[34]Stroux, Johannes, *Summum Ius*, p. 129.

Quintilian's statements concerning the stasis are likewise found to be meaningful and correct. We may regret that he did not explain for us the fundamental relation between the physical and the rhetorical stasis, but we find no fault whatever with his explanation (III, vi, 1-5): "That which I call Stasis, some style the Constitution, others the Question, and still others, that which may be inferred from the Question, while Theodorus called it the fountain-head, or primary source (as of a river) to which everything in the debate is to be referred." (With Theodorus' explanation, compare *Physics*, 261a25: "it is the self-movement that we declare to be the first principle of things that are moved and impart motion and the primary source to which things that are in motion are to be referred," Ross, p. 261a). We understand also how Quintilian as a scholar might prefer to retain the historic Greek term *stasis* and how, as a practical rhetor, he would describe it as the main point in the argument on which the whole matter turns (III, vi, 21).

The explanation which Pseudo-Augustine gives to the statement which he 'borrowed' from his *Vorlage* also becomes more intelligible in the light of this study. His interpretation (Section 12, lines 13-18) may be represented diagrammatically, thus:

At first *(primo)*, i.e., at A, there is as yet no contact, and hence, no *pugna*, or fight, between the parties. However, as they advance and come closer to one another, there is imminent danger that they might come to blows. At the critical moment, the question intervenes, comes between them; it embraces each of the parties, as it were, in one of its arms, holds them apart and stops them (for if and when and as long as they struggle, there is motion, cf. 938a25, *machomenos de kineitai*). According to Pseudo-Augustine, the question is called the status because both parties stand still in it, i.e., stop advancing, desist from fighting, each insisting on what he has previously maintained, each equally in control of, and controlled by the other.

We conclude our study by asking again the age-old question: "What, then, is stasis?"[35] We answer: In Pre-Aristotelian Greek thought, in Aristotle's physical philosophy and in the *meta*physical rhetoric of Post-Aristotelian Peripatetics of the Third Century before Christ, it was the rest, pause, halt, or

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[35] *Ti esti stasis;* See, *Commentarium Codicis Vaticani Gr. 107* in Hermogenis *peri staseon et peri heureseos* edidit Georgius Kowalski, (Lwów, 1939).

standing still, which inevitably occurs between opposite as well as between contrary 'moves', or motions. In rhetorical Noesis, it was frequently identified with the thing sought in the zetesis, i.e., the *zětěma, quaestio,* or the Question. To the *Auctor ad Herennium* it was the *constitutio,* i.e., the organ of rhetorical action, the instrument and implement of controversy, the body, or functional system of argument. To Cicero it was likewise a constitution, i.e., a natural start, or physical beginning, an original form, the originative and archemorphic conflict out of which individually modified controversies arise, an archetype of dispute, or argument. To Theodorus stasis was the originative head, or primary source, to which everything moved in the debate must be related. To Quintilian and to Pseudo-Augustine it was the main question in debate. At no time, however, did the term wholly lose its original physical denotation as that which is neither a kinesis, nor an eremēsis, but both, or the opposite, or contrary, of both, namely, the ambivalent, bi-functional stasis, station, or standing still, which necessarily must occur momentarily in-between opposite 'changes' and in-between contrary motions, movements, processes, functions, or forces in action.[36]

Further to trace the concept stasis through the ages is the task of the history of rhetoric. Our goal has been accomplished if we have succeeded in shedding any light of truth upon its origin and thereby restoring to the ancient term some of the dignity which it had before it fell into the hands of rhetoricians[37] who knew not Aristotle's natural science.

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[36]That the political concept, stasis, is likewise an adaptation of the physical concept is indicated by Menecles (146-118 B.C.) Scholium on *Pindar Pythian Ode,* IV, 10a, in Jacoby, Felix, *Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker* (Berlin, 1929), III, 1, p. 83. Note also the unconvincing explanation offered by Barker, Ernest, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford, 1948), p. 448: "Stasis . . . the word means the act of forming (and thence the body of persons forming) a combination for the attainment of some political end by legal or illegal means."

[37]Hermogenis *Opera,* Edidit H. Rabe, (Leipzig, 1913), p. 35; See also, Walz, *Rh. Gr.* V, 77, 592.